The effect of a treatment in a multiagent economy, e.g., a price increase, is causal if the treated economy would be different, e.g., in terms of revenue, relative to the control economy. Causal effects measured in an equilibrium of the economy, the longterm causal effects, are more representative of the value of such treatments. However, the statistical estimation of long-term causal effects is difficult because it has to rely, for practical reasons, on experimental data where agents are randomly assigned to the treated or the control economy, and their actions are observed before an equilibrium is reached. We propose a methodology to define and estimate long-term causal effects, which relies on a model of agent behaviors that plays a two-fold role. First, it predicts how agents would behave under different assignments, and, second, it predicts how agents would behave in equilibrium. These two prediction tasks enable the estimation of long-term causal effects under suitable assumptions, which we state explicitly.
Introduction
A multiagent economy is comprised of a population of agents interacting with each other through economic transactions that are regulated by certain rules. A common problem in the design of such economies is to evaluate the effects of an intervention to their rules on an objective, i.e., a quantity of interest. For example, an online ad auction platform is a multiagent economy, where one question of interest is the effect of raising the reserve price on the platform's revenue. The effect from the intervention, also known as the treatment, is said to be causal if the objective value is different in a treated economy, i.e., an economy operating under the new rules, than it is in a control economy, i.e., an economy operating under the old rules.
To empirically evaluate such treatment effects, the simplest experimental approach is to randomly assign certain agents to a treated economy and others to a control economy, and then compare the outcomes. However, to assess causality we need to address two distinct challenges, namely Figure 1 : The two inferential tasks for causal inference in multiagent economies. First, use the observed data to infer across treatment assignments (y-axis), particularly, to assignments where all agents are in the treated economy (top assignment, Z = 1), and all agents are in the control economy (bottom assignment, Z = 0). Second, use the observed data to infer across time, from time t 0 (observation period) to time T (long-term).
#1. Estimate the counterfactuals; i.e., estimate the objective value when all agents are assigned to treatment relative to the objective value when all agents are assigned to control;
#2. Estimate the counterfactuals in #1 in the long term; i.e., when the economy, either treated or untreated, is in some sort of equilibrium.
The first challenge is the, so-called, "fundamental problem of causal inference" (Holland, 1986; Rubin, 2011) , and states a simple fact that is often overlooked when estimating treatment effects, that is the ultimate goal of the experiment is to select either the treatment or control, and then apply that selection to all agents in the economy. Therefore, the outcomes of interest correspond only to two treatment assignments: outcomes measured when all agents are assigned to treatment, and outcomes measured when all agents are assigned to control. However, in an experiment only one treatment assignment is possible, and only some agents are assigned to treatment, while the rest are assigned to control. The second challenge is unique to causal inference in dynamical systems and has received limited attention so far. It is also crucial to address because long-term causal effects, i.e., effects measured after the system has reached some sort of equilibrium, are more representative of the value of the treatment. For instance, raising the reserve price in an auction might increase revenue in the short-term but as agents adapt their bids, or switch to another platform altogether, the long-term effect could be a net decrease in revenue Holland and Miller (1991) .
To resolve these two challenges we therefore need to perform two inferential tasks, namely (1) infer outcomes across treatment assignments, and (2) infer outcomes across time, both tasks using only short-term experimental data. These inferential tasks are graphically illustrated in Figure 1 .
Central to our approach in resolving these challenges is to assume that agents adopt, at each time point, a behavior that is latent. A behavioral model defines the distribution of the actions an agent takes conditional on the adopted behavior, and can be leveraged from behavioral game theory. The behavioral model is coupled with a temporal model that defines the temporal evolution of agent behaviors. The parameters of these two models are estimated using short-term observed data. The fitted model parameters are then used to predict the long-term agent behaviors, and thus estimate the long-term causal effect of interest, under certain ignorability assumptions that we state explicitly.
However, our approach does not rely on a particular behavioral or temporal model. For example, in the application of Section 4, we use the quantal k-level (QLk), by Stahl and Wilson Stahl and Wilson (1994) , as the behavioral model, and a lag-one vector autoregressive model, denoted by VAR(1), as the temporal model. More sophisticated models can certainly be used, however, these would still need to perform the inferential tasks of Figure 1.
Related work
In this section, we discuss a few selected prior works that are characteristic of approaches to handling the inferential tasks of Figure 1 . We will then briefly contrast with our work, and leave more details to the supplementary material.
Ostrovsky and Schwartz (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011) wanted to determine whether an increase in reserve price of Yahoo! ad auctions would improve revenue. Auctions were randomly assigned to an increased reserve price treatment, and the effect was estimated using difference-in-differences (DID) Card and Krueger (1994) ; Donald and Lang (2007) ; Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) . The DID method compares the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention for both the treated and control units -the ad auctions in this experimentand then compares the two differences. DID extrapolates across assignments and across time by making a strong additivity assumption (Abadie, 2005; Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Section 5.2) ; specifically, by assuming that the dependence of revenue on reserve price and time has an additive structure.
In a similar problem, Athey et. al. Athey et al. (2011) studied the effects of timber auction format (ascending versus sealed bid) on competition for timber tracts. Their approach was to estimate agent valuations from observed data (agent bids) in one auction format and then impute counterfactual bid distributions in the other auction format, under the assumption of equilibrium play in the observed data. This approach extrapolates across assignments by assuming the agent valuations are independent of treatment assignment, and extrapolates across time by assuming that the observed agent bids are already in equilibrium. In econometrics, similar structural approaches are taken for estimation of general equilibrium effects Heckman et al. (1998); Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) Bottou et. al. Bottou et al. (2013) studied the causal effect on revenue of interventions in the machine learning algorithm that scores online ads in the Bing search engine. Their approach was to create a directed acyclic graph (DAG) among related variables, such as queries, bids, and prices. Through a "Causal Markov" assumption they could predict counterfactuals for revenue, using only data from the control economy (observational study). This approach extrapolates across assignments and across time because it (implicitly) assumes that the underlying DAG is the correct data model, and does not depend on the treatment assignment. This assumption of a well-specified DAG is crucial in transferring the estimates from the observed data to counterfactuals. Dash Dash and Druzdzel (2001) has also challenged the approach, arguing that the feedback that is inherent in dynamical systems is incompatible with the DAG formalism, such as the Do operator.
Our approach is distinct from prior work for two main reasons. First, we assume the units of analysis to be the individual agents, on which the treatment is applied. This allows us to leverage behavioral game theory to perform the necessary inferential tasks across assignments and across time. This is helpful when there is information in the data to understand agent actions, which otherwise would be ignored by other methods. For example, in the application of Section 4, agents are playing with a known, fixed payoff matrix. In this case, the data can be used to estimate a behavioral model of how agents act under such game rules; in contrast, this data cannot be leveraged by other methods.
A second important distinction of our work is that we do not assume equilibrium play, which is an assumption subsumed by both the DID Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) and structural approaches Athey et al. (2011) . We thus distinguish short-term experimental data that are available for inference from the long-term outcomes that are the inferential target (Figure 1 ). In contrast, structural approaches typically assume that the observed data are produced when the economy is at an equilibrium, and thus they do not distinguish between short-term and long-term effects. This is generally unjustified, especially when an intervention has taken place and agents still adapt their play.
Definitions
We assume a set of agents I, a set of games G and a set of actions A, indexed by i, j and a, respectively. The difference between games corresponds to the distinction between a control and one or more treatments. The designer wants to run an experiment to select the best game from G according to some objective, for example, the revenue of an auction format.
In the experiment, each agent is assigned to one game, and the experimenter observes agent actions over time. Let Z = (Z i ) be the |I| × 1 assignment vector where Z i ∈ G denotes the assignment of agent i to a game; Z = j1 indicates that all agents are assigned to game j, where 1 denotes the vector of ones. The assignment is made at random such that every game has the same number of agents.
After assignment, the games proceed simultaneously at discrete time steps indexed by t, from time t = 0 to t = t o . A it (Z) ∈ A denotes the action of agent i at time t under assignment Z. The aggregate action α j,t (Z) ∈ ∆ |A| , where ∆ p denotes the p-dimensional simplex, is the frequency of actions of agents assigned to game j; for example, assuming two actions A = {a 1 , a 2 }, α j,t (Z) = (0.2, 0.8) denotes that 20% of agents play action a 1 in game j at time t under assignment Z, and the rest play a 2 .
The experimenter uses an objective, denoted by R, such that the objective value in game j at time t under assignment Z is R j,t (Z) = h(α j,t (Z)), for some function h : ∆ |A| → R. For instance, suppose in the previous example that a 1 and a 2 produce revenue $10 and −$2, respectively, each time they are played, then h is linear and R j,t (Z) = 0.2·$10−0.8·$2 = $0.4. Definition 2.1. The causal effect at time t on objective R of game j relative to game j is defined as
Given a time T that represents the long-term time of interest, the designer considers game j to be better than game j if and only if τ (j, j ; T ) > 0.
1 Thus, τ (j, j ; T ) is the long-term causal effect of game j relative to game j . This quantity is the estimand of interest because the two objective values, R j,T (j1) and R j ,T (j 1), are at the end-points of the inferential targets in Figure 1 . However, neither value is observed in the experiment because agents are randomly assigned to games, and their actions are observed for a short-term period [0, t 0 ]. As mentioned in Section 1, the two challenges are the extrapolation across assignments and the extrapolation across time, using short-term data from the experiment.
Estimation of Long-term Causal Effects
The central component of our approach is to assume a latent behavioral model for how agents select actions. The particular behavioral model that we adopt in the application will come from behavioral game theory. The behavioral model is used to infer agent actions conditional on agent behaviors, and is coupled with a temporal model to infer agent behaviors in the long-term, conditional on behavioral history. Taken together, the two models are used to infer agent actions in the long-term, and thus estimate long-term causal effects.
Let B denote the finite set of behaviors, indexed by b, and let B it (Z) ∈ B denote the behavior agent i adopts at time t under assignment Z. The following definition of a behavioral model connects behaviors to actions.
Definition 3.1 (Behavioral model). A behavioral model on set B is a collection of probabilities
for every action a ∈ A and every behavior b ∈ B, where G j indicates conditioning on a game j.
For example, a non-sophisticated behavior b 0 could imply that P (A it (Z) = a|b 0 , G j ) = 1/|A|, for every action a and game j, i.e., an action is selected uniformly at random. By conditioning on the game, we allow an agent to choose its actions based on expected payoffs, which depend on the game characteristics. For instance, in the application of Section 4 we consider a behavioral model where an agent picks actions in a game according to its expected payoffs, calculated from the game-specific payoff matrix.
The aggregate behavior β j,t (Z) ∈ ∆ |B| denotes the frequency at time t under assignment Z of the adopted behaviors of agents assigned to game j. Let F t denote the entire history of aggregate behaviors up to time t. A temporal model of behaviors is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Temporal model).
A temporal model for game j is a collection of parameters {(φ j Z , ψ j Z )}, for every assignment Z, and two densities (π, f ), such that, at every time t,
Thus, a temporal model defines the distribution of β j,t (Z) as a time-series, for every assignment Z. The temporal model imposes the restriction that the prior π of behaviors at t = 0, and the density f of behavioral evolution, are both independent of treatment assignment. However, their parameters may depend on treatment assignment.
A behavioral model and temporal model, together, define a hidden Markov model of agent actions. Conceptually, to predict the long-term actions at time T in game j under assignment Z, we (1) estimate the latent behavior at β j,t 0 (Z) using the forward algorithm (Bishop, 2006) , (2) estimate β j,T (Z) from β j,t 0 (Z) and the temporal model, and (3) estimate α j,T (Z) conditional on β j,T (Z).
But as described so far, this procedure only captures the actions under the experimental treatment assignment Z, whereas our goal is to estimate the actions α j,T (j1) and α j ,T (j 1) in order to estimate the long-term causal effect τ (j, j ; T ). Thus, so far we have only established inference across time (i.e., along the x-axis in Figure 1 ), but not inference across assignments (y-axis in Figure 1 ). We now state two assumptions that enable such inference.
Assumption 3.1 (No anticipation). Let β j,−1 (Z) be the aggregate behavior in game j before assignment Z happens at t = 0. Then, there exists a fixed aggregate behavior β (0) j such that, for every game j and assignment Z,
Assumption 3.1 posits that agents do not anticipate the future assignment Z, and thus are not affected on how they adopt their behaviors before the assignment.
Assumption 3.2 (Behavioral ignorability).
The treatment assignment is independent of aggregate behavior at time t, conditional on the game and the game history up to t; i.e.,
Assumption 3.2 states that the treatment assignment does not add information about the aggregate agent behaviors at time t if we already know the full history of agent behaviors up to t, and the game the agents are assigned to; hence, the treatment assignment is ignorable. This ignorability assumption precludes an agent being able to distinguish between other agents in the economy, e.g., an agent being able to adopt a different behavior depending on whether it was assigned with friends or foes in the experiment.
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, combined, enable inference of counterfactuals across assignments. In particular, given a temporal model, Assumption 3.1 implies that the prior parameter φ j Z does not depend on Z, since agents start with a fixed aggregate behavior β (0) j , and they are randomly assigned to games. Assumption 3.2 further implies that ψ j Z does not depend on Z in Eq. (3), since the treatment assignment is independent of the aggregate behavior at t, conditional on the history and the game. This leads to Algorithm 1 for estimation of long-term causal effects. The estimation procedure in the algorithm accepts as input two games j, j and short-term data D j , D j , where D k = {α k,t (Z)}, for t = 0, 1, . . . , t 0 , and returns an estimate of τ (j, j ; T ). The algorithm is depicted graphically in Figure 2 .
Algorithm 1 Estimation of long-term causal effects
Using data D k , the behavioral model (2), and the temporal model (3), estimate
Using φ k from Step 2, Assumption 3.1, and the assumed experimental randomization, estimate β
k .
4:
Using β
k , which holds by definition.
5:
Using ψ k from
Step 2, β k,0 (k1) from
Step 4, and the temporal model (3), estimate
Using β k,T (k1) from
Step 5 and the behavioral model (2), estimate α k,T (k1).
7: end for 8: Estimate τ (j, j ; T ) using estimates α j,T (j1) and α j ,T (j 1) produced in Step 6.
It is important to note that Algorithm 1 can either be viewed as producing point estimates, or as producing posterior distributions conditional on the observed data. For example, in Step 2 we can either estimate β (0) k using the maximum-likelihood estimate given observed actions α k,0 (Z), or take its posterior distribution conditional on these actions, assuming appropriate priors. The same holds for all subsequent steps.
Theorem 3.1 (Estimation of long-term effects). Suppose that Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. Then, Algorithm 1 identifies the long-term causal effect (1) as the size of data sets D j , D j increases.
Theorem 1 establishes the validity of Algorithm 1 for estimation of long-term causal effects, and relies on being able to identify the parameters (φ j , ψ j ), for each game j. This is possible when there is enough available data (e.g., through multiple experiments), or the observation period [0, t 0 ] increases. The proof follows the Bayesian interpretation of Algorithm 1 and is given in the supplementary material.
Discussion
Our approach to inference of long-term causal effects has two components. The first component involves a temporal and behavioral model, defined by the designer, which allow inference across time under a fixed assignment. The second component involves Assumptions 1 and 2, which allow inference across assignments. According to Theorem 6.1, the two components, combined, allow inference of long-term causal effects through Algorithm 1. 
j , which holds by definition; (E) estimate β j,T (j1) from β j,0 (j1) and parameters (φ j , ψ j ) of the temporal model estimated in (A). Finally, α j,T (j1) can be estimated from β j,T (j1) and the behavioral model (2).
We make the following comments. First, there can be other approaches for inference of agent actions across time that do not rely on behavioral models. However, our approach allows us to leverage the extensive literature from behavioral game theory (Stahl and Wilson, 1994; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) , which has been successful in predicting human actions in real-world experiments through behavioral models (Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010) . This combination of behavioral game theory with causal inference is novel, and opens up new possibilities for causal inference in multiagent economies.
Second, our approach does not rely on a particular behavioral or temporal model. Instead, we think that the appropriate choice of these models should be made by the designer. For example, in Section 4, we chose the VAR(1) model as the temporal model of behaviors. This model performs well in this context, likely because the economy is comprised of only several two-person games. More complicated economies will generally require more complicated temporal models, but the underlying idea behind Algorithm 1 remains the same: causal effects need to be evaluated in the long-term using only short-term data.
Third, Assumptions 1 and 2 may be hard to test in practice. However, one idea to test Assumption 3.2 is to use data from multiple experiments on a single game j. If fitting the temporal model (3) on such data yields parameter estimates (φ j Z , ψ j Z ) that depend on experimental assignment Z, then Assumption 2 would be unjustified. A similar test can be applied for Assumption 3.1.
4 Application using Behavioral Game Theory Rapoport and Boebel Rapoport and Boebel (1992) conducted a simple experiment on a zero-sum, two-agent game. The game was a simultaneous-move game with ten discrete actions, namely A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 }, with five actions available to each agent. The structure of the payoff matrix, given in the supplementary material (Table 1) , is parametrized by two values, W and L. The experiment used two different versions of payoff matrices, corresponding to payments by the row agent to the column agent when it won (W ), or lost (L): they used (W, L) = ($10, −$6) for game 0 and (W, L) = ($15, −$1) for game 1. For example, if the row agent picks action a 1 and the column agent plays a 3 in game 0, then the row agent has to pay $6 to the column agent.
Forty subjects (agents), I = {1, 2, . . . , 40}, were randomized to each game (20 agents per game), and each agent played both as row agent and as column agent, within the same game, in a match-up against two different agents. Every match-up lasted two periods (four periods in total) of 60 rounds, where each round consisted of a selection of an action from each agent and a payment. The aggregate data for the experiment are given in Table 2 of the supplementary, which reports the aggregate distribution of actions adopted by agents within each period.
Although the experiment was designed for a different purpose, we can take advantage of the randomization in the experiment, and ask a question in regard to long-term causal effects. In particular, assuming that agents pay a fee for each action taken, which accounts for the revenue of the game, we ask the following question: "What is the long-term causal effect on revenue if we switch from payoffs (W, L) = ($10, −$6) of game 0 to payoffs (W, L) = ($15, −$1) of game 1?".
To evaluate our method, we will consider the last period -fourth period-as long-term, and hold out data on that period. Although this repurposing of the data is necessarily artificial in the way the particular objective is crafted, we view this as a good demonstration of our approach. In particular, we define the causal estimand (1) as
where T = 3 and c is a vector of coefficients. The interpretation is that, given an element c a of c, the agent playing action a is assumed to pay a constant fee c a to the game designer.
To check for robustness of our method, we test Algorithm 1 by using multiple values of c, where its elements are sampled uniformly in the interval (0, 1).
Concrete Methodology
Building upon the insights of Section 3, we now develop a concrete methodology to estimate the estimand (1) of long-term causal effects. We will then apply this methodology to estimate (16). As the behavioral model, we adopt the quantal k-response (QL k ) model Stahl and Wilson (1994) , which has been successful in predicting human actions in real-world experiments Wright and Leyton-Brown (2010) . We choose k = 3, for simplicity, which implies three behaviors, namely B = {b 0 , b 1 , b 2 } of increased sophistication. As explained below, QL 3 is parametrized by λ = (λ 1 , λ (1)2 , λ 2 ), known in the game theory literature as the precision parameters; their function is explained below. QL 3 defines the following behavioral model:
• For agent adopting behavior b 0 ,
Thus, agents adopting behavior b 0 , also known as level-0 agents, simply randomize their actions.
• Let u a be the expected utility if an agent plays action a against a level-0 agent. Then,
Thus, agents adopting behavior b 1 , the level-1 agents, have precision λ 1 , and play as if best-responding to a level-0 agent. The precision parameter λ 1 determines how much an agent insists on playing to maximize expected utility; for example, if λ 1 = ∞, the agent plays the action with maximum expected payoff (best response); if λ 1 = 0, the agent randomizes similar to a level-0 agent.
• Let u a be the expected utility if an agent plays action a against a level-1 agent with precision λ (1)2 . Then,
Thus, agents adopting behavior b 2 , the level-2 agents, have precision λ 2 , and play as if they are best-responding to a level-1 agent with precision λ (1)2 .
As a temporal model, we adopt the lag-one vector autoregressive model, also known as VAR(1). As is typical in the analysis of time-series of compositional data Aitchison (1986) ; Grunwald et al. (1993) , we transform 2 the proportion into a new variable w j,t = logit(β jt (Z)). We assume
where ψ j 1 , ψ j 2 are scalar, for simplicity and
) is the parameter of the temporal model. Also, t ∼ N (0, I) is i.i.d. standard multivariate normal. As the prior π on β j,0 (Z), we choose the Dirichlet on ∆ |B| with parameter φ j . We can now write down the full likelihood for the model, which has parameters λ j for the QL 3 model, and ψ j , φ j for the VAR(1) model, for each game j. Consider an initial assignment Z, and the observed data on aggregate agent actions D j = {α jt (Z), t = 0, 1, . . . , t 0 }. For 2 The map logit : R m−1 → ∆ m is defined such that y = logit(x), for vectors y = (y 1 , . . . , y m−1 ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), i x i = 1, and x 1 = 0 wlog, indicates that y i = log(x i+1 /x 1 ), for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. notational convenience, let α t = α j,t (Z), b t = β j,t (Z), and B = {β t , t = 0, 1, . . . , t 0 }, then the marginal likelihood over the aggregate agent behaviors B is equal to
where the individual terms are computed as follows. Let P (λ j ) be the |A| × |B| matrix with (a, b) element equal to P ab (λ j ) = P (A it (Z) = a|B it (Z) = b, G j ), as defined in Eqs. (5), (6), and (7). Then,α t = P (λ j )β t is the probability mass function (pmf) over actions predicted by the QL 3 model, conditional on aggregate behavior β t . Then,
where Multi(x; N, p) denotes the density of observed counts x from a multinomial distribution with N draws, and probability vector p. The term f (β t |β t−1 ; ψ j ) can be computed from the VAR(1) model as,
where w j,t = logit(β t ), and N (x, I) here indicates the multivariate standard normal density of x. Finally,
is the prior of the temporal model, which we assumed is the Dirichlet density with parameter φ j .
Experimental Results
We now fit our model to the dataset of Rapoport and Boebel Rapoport and Boebel (1992) , which is shown in Table 2 of the supplementary material. Our approach was to get a posterior distribution of the model parameters using the likelihood (9), and priors on the parameters. More details on the priors and the MCMC procedure are given in the supplementary material, including posterior marginals of the model parameters. Because all latent aggregate behaviors had to be marginalized out, as shown in Eq.(9), our model was overspecified. To solve this problem we used regularization but in way that incorporated a "game-theoretic prior"; i.e., the parameters ψ of the temporal model and the aggregate behavior in the limit were penalized according to how far away their prediction of long-term agent actions was from the Nash equilibrium of the game. This form of regularization inspired by game theory is new to our best knowledge, and seemed more effective than generic regularizations, e.g., L 1 .
Point estimates along with the true value of the long-term causal effect τ (1, 0; 4) of Eq. (16) We also applied differences-in-differences (DID), which compares outcomes in t = 2 and t = 0, and a naive method, which uses outcomes at t = 2 to predict outcomes at t = 3, in order to get other point estimates to compare with. For convenience, we will refer to our method as LACE, which stands for "long-term average causal effects". We observe that our estimates are closer to the truth (mse = 0.045) than the estimates from the naive method (mse = 0.185), and than the estimates from DID (mse = 0.361). Such results are expected: as long as a behavioral model can predict agent actions well, an approach that is based on such model can pull up more information from the data to predict future actions.
Conclusion
In this paper, we defined the problem of estimating long-term causal effects of a treatment in a multiagent economy. A method that aims to tackle this problem needs to predict how agents will act, in equilibrium, if all agents are assigned to the treated economy, and how they will act, in equilibrium, if all are assigned to the control economy.
Our first contribution is to explicate a set of sufficient assumptions for identification of such long-term causal effects, and then develop an estimation method. The method relies on a latent behavioral model, to predict agent actions conditional on agent behaviors, along with a temporal model to predict long-term behaviors given short-term behaviors, estimated from short-term data on agent actions. The two models, combined, can estimate long-term causal effects, under our assumptions.
There are several open issues. One important issue is when agents compete with each other across games and are able to switch to other competing economies. This would require inference of agent actions across different economies, in addition to inference across assignments and time. Another, more theoretical concern, is whether it is possible to establish necessary assumptions for the identification of long-term causal effects. On the practical side, it would be important to test our method on a multiagent economy, e.g., an auction platform, that is larger and more realistic than the two-person games in the behavioral experiment of Rapoport and Boebel Rapoport and Boebel (1992) . We believe that progress in answering such questions will lead to new and fruitful interactions of game theory with experimental design and causal inference.
Appendix
The following lemma will be mentioned in the proof of Theorem 1 for the unbiased estimation of long-term agent actions. It establishes the expected agent actions conditional on latent behaviors.
Lemma 6.1. For every game j there exists a left-stochastic, |A| × |B| matrix P j such that
for any time t and assignment Z.
Proof. By definition, a behavior model defines a probability mass function over actions; thus, let p ab denote the probability that an agent adopting behavior b selects action a. Then
Let α j,t (Z) a be the ath element of α j,t (Z) and β j,t (Z) b be the bth element of β j,t (Z). Then,
The ath element of E (α j,t (Z)) is equal to P (A it (Z) = a). Thefore, from Eq. (12) we get α j,t (Z) a = b∈B p ab β j,t (Z) b , which leads to (11), where P j is the matrix with p ab as the element in row a and column b. Since b∈B p ab = 1 matrix P j is left-stochastic.
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 6.1 (Estimation of long-term effects). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, Algorithm 1 identifies the long-term causal effect (1) as the size of data sets D j , D j increases.
Proof. Fix a game j, and assume all model parameters, ψ, φ to implicitly have superscript j. Furthermore, under Assumption 1, all expectations in this proof are implicitly conditional on the fixed but unknown aggregate behavior β (0) j . Given the temporal model, there exists a density for the aggregate behavior at an arbitrary t conditional on the aggregate behavior at t = 0, denoted by g(β j,t (Z)|β j,0 (Z), ψ). To see this, let β t = β j,t (Z) for brevity, and let B t = (β 1 , β 2 , . . . , β t ), i.e., it is the history of aggregate behaviors up to t with β j,0 (Z) removed. Then, we can derive g explicitly as,
where all the terms in the last integral use the density f of the temporal model. Now, given Assumption 1 and the complete randomization in assignment Z, it follows
for any game j and assignment Z (recall that all expectations are conditional on β (0) ). Intuitively, the initial aggregate behavior at t = 0 in game/assignment unbiasedly estimates β (0) by randomization, since agents (in aggregate) decide their initial behavior independently of any assignment. Take X as a random variable distributed according to π φ , the prior in the temporal model. Then, by Assumption 1,
Given observed data {α j,t (Z), t = 0, 1, . . . , t 0 }, assume estimatesψ,φ for the temporal model. When many such data sets exists, or as t 0 → ∞, the true parameter values can be identified, i.e.,ψ → ψ andφ → φ.
, where X is distributed according to π φ . Our claim is now that the density g(·|β 0 ,ψ) unbiasedly estimates the density of β j,T (j1). First, note that β j,0 (j1) is the aggregate behavior at t = 0 when all agents are assigned to game j. Then, by Assumption 1, it follows β j,0 (j1) = β (0) . Thus, by Assumption 2, the density of β j,T (j1) is g(·|β (0) , ψ). Sinceβ 0 → β (0) andψ → ψ, by the continuous mapping theorem, g(·|β 0 ,ψ) → g(·|β 0 , ψ). Finally, the density of α j,T (j1) can be obtained from g(·|β 0 ,ψ) and the behavioral model. An unbiased estimate of these actions is straightforward using Lemma 1.
Connection of assumptions to policy invariance
Assumption 2 in our framework is related to policy invariance assumptions adopted for the econometrics of policy effects Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) ; Heckman et al. (1998) , where, given the choice of policy by an agent, the initial process that resulted in this choice does not affect the outcome. For example, given that an individual chooses to participate in a tax benefit program, the way the individual was assigned to the program (e.g., lottery, recommendation, or point of a gun) does not alter the outcome that will observed for that individual. Our assumption is different, because we have a temporal evolution of aggregate behavior and there is no free choice of an agent about the assignment. But it shares the essential aspect of ignorability of assignment under appropriate conditions.
Discussion of related methods
Consider the estimand for the Rapoport-Boebel experiment Rapoport and Boebel (1992) :
In this section, we discuss how standard methods would estimate (16). Our goal is to illustrate the fundamental assumptions underpinning each method, and compare with our Assumptions 1 and 2. To illustrate we will assume a specific value for c = (0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1) .
In discussing these methods, we will mostly be concerned with how point estimates compare to the true value of the estimand (which is τ = $0.054 using the experimental data in Table  2 .) The simplest approach would be to consider only the latest time point, t = 3 under the experiment assignment Z, and use the estimatê
Assuming statistical significance, this estimate would imply that game 1 is worse than game 0 in terms of revenue, contrary to our ground truth that game 1 is actually better. For this estimate to be unbiased for τ , we need A it (Z) ≡ A i (Z i ), which is a strong simplifying assumption that ignores the dynamic nature of agent actions. Such an approach is not uncommon in the literature of treatment effects Imbens and Rubin (2009) (Chapter 3) , but can only be justified when a strong assumption, such as "SUTVA" (stable unit-treatment value assumption), is reasonable.
A more sophisticated approach is to analyze the agent actions as a time series. For example , Brodersen et. al. Brodersen et al. (2014) developed a method to estimate the effects of ad campaigns on website visits. Their method was based on the idea of "synthetic controls", i.e., they created a time-series using different sources of information that would act as the counterfactual to the observed time-series after the intervention. However, their problem is macroeconometric and they work with observational data. Thus, there is neither experimental randomized assignment to games, nor strategic interference between agents, nor dynamic agent actions. More crucially, they do not study long-term, equilbrium effects. By construction, in our problem we can leverage behavioral game theory to make, arguably, more informed predictions of counterfactuals to time points at which equilibrium after the intervention has been restored.
Another approach, common in econometrics, is the so-called difference-in-differences (DID) estimator Card and Krueger (1994) ; Donald and Lang (2007) ; Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) . In our case, this method is not perfectly applicable because there are no observations before the intervention, but we can still entertain the idea by considering period t = 1 as the pre-intervention period. The DID estimator compares the difference in outcomes before and after the intervention for both the "treated" and "control" groups. In our application, this estimator iŝ δ = (c (α 2,3 (Z) − α 2,1 (Z))) change in revenue for game 2 − (c (α 1,3 (Z) − α 1,1 (Z))) change in revenue for game 1 = −$0.164.
This estimate is also far from the true value, assuming statistical significance. This estimator is unbiased for τ only if there is an additive structure in the actions Abadie (2005) , Angrist and Pischke (2008) (Section 5.2), e.g., α j,t (Z) = µ j + λ t + jt , where µ j is a game-specific parameter, λ t is a temporal parameter, and is noise. The DID estimator thus captures a linear trend in the data by assuming a common parameter for both treatment arms (λ t ) that is canceled out in subtraction in Eq. (18). The extent to which an additivity assumption is reasonable depends on the application, however, by definition, it implies ignorability of the assignment (i.e., Z does not appear in the model of α j,t (Z)), and thus it is a stronger than our Assumption 2. Abadie (2005); Angrist and Pischke (2008) . Athey et. al. Athey et al. (2011) study the effects of timber auction format (ascending versus sealed bid) on competition for timber tracts. Standard in econometrics for auctions, they estimate bidder valuations from observed data in one auction and impute counterfactual bid distributions in the other auction, under the assumption of equilibrium play in both auctions. This approach makes two critical implicit assumptions that together are stronger than Assumption 2. First, the bidder valuation distribution is assumed to be a primitive that can be used to impute counterfactuals in other treatment assignments. In other words, the assignment is independent of bidder values, and thus it is strongly ignorable. Second, although imputation is performed for potential outcomes in equilibrium, which captures the notion of long-term effects, inference is performed under the assumption of equilibrium play in the observed outcomes, and thus temporal dynamic behavior assumed away.
Finally, another popular approach to causality is through directed acyclical graphs (DAGs) between the variables of interest Pearl (2000) . For example, Bottou et. al. Bottou et al. (2013) study the causal effects of the machine learning algorithm that scores online ads in the Bing search engine on the search engine revenue. Their approach is to create a full DAG of the system including variables such as queries, bids, and prices, and make a Causal Markov assumption for the DAG. This allows to predict counterfactuals for the revenue under manipulations of the scoring algorithm, using only observed data generated from the assumed DAG. However, a key assumption of the DAG approach is that the underlying structural equation model is stable under the treatment assignment, and only edges coming from parents of the manipulated variable need to be removed; again, assignment is considered strongly ignorable. As pointed out by Dash Dash and Druzdzel (2001) , this might be implausible in equilibrium systems. Consider, for example, a system where X → Y ← Z, and a manipulation that sets the distribution of Y independently of X, Z. Then after manipulation the two edges will need to be removed. However, if in an equilibrium it is required that Y ≈ XZ, then the two arrows should be reversed after the manipulation. Proper causal inference in equilibrium systems remains an open area without a well-established methodology Dash (2005). 6.4 Application: Experiment of Rapoport and Boebel Rapoport and Boebel (1992) Table 1 : Normal-form game in the experiment of Rapoport and Boebel (values L and W are specified as described in the body of the paper) Rapoport and Boebel (1992 Table 2 : Frequency of actions for the row agent and the column agent in the experiment by Rapoport and Boebel Rapoport and Boebel (1992) broken down by game and session. Gray color indicates that we assume the data as hold-out. The frequencies for actions a 5 , a 5 can be inferred.
More details on the QL k model
In QL k , agents possess increasing levels of sophistication. Following earlier work Wright and Leyton-Brown (2010), we adopt k = 3, and thus consider a behavioral space with three different behavior types B = {b 0 , b 1 , b 2 }.
Recall that a behavior b ∈ B represents the distribution of actions that an agent will play after adopting that behavior. In QL k such distributions depend on an assumption of quantal response, which is defined as follows. Let u ∈ R |A| denote a vector such that u a is the expected utility of an agent taking action a ∈ A, and let F j denote the payoff matrix in game j as in Table 1 . If an agent is facing another agent with behavior b, then u = F j b.
The quantal best-response with parameter λ determines the distribution of actions that the agent will take facing expected utilities u, and is defined as
where, for a vector x with elements x i , logistic(x) is a vector with elements exp(x i )/ i exp(x i ). The parameter λ ≥ 0 is called the precision of the quantal best-response. If λ is very large then the response is closer to the classical Nash best-response, whereas if λ = 0 the agent ignores the utilities and randomizes among actions. Let λ = (λ 1 , λ (1)2 , λ 2 ) be the precision parameters. Given parameters λ, QL 3 calculates the distribution of actions that agent play as follows:
• Agents who adopt b 0 , termed level-0 agents, have precision λ 0 = 0, and thus will randomly pick one action from the action space A. Thus, b 0 = QBR(u; 0) = (1/|A|)1, regardless of the argument u.
• An agent who adopts b 1 , termed level-1 agent, has precision λ 1 and assumes that is playing against a level-0 type agent. Thus, the agent is facing a vector of utilities u 1 = F j b 0 , and so b 1 = QBR(u 1 ; λ 1 ).
• An agent who adopts b 2 , termed level-2 agent, has precision λ 2 and assumes is playing against a level-1 agent with precision λ (1)2 . Thus, it estimates that it is facing an agent with behavior b (1)2 = QBR(u 1 ; λ (1)2 ), where u 1 = F j b 0 as above. The expected utility vector of the level-2 agent is u 2 = F j b (1)2 , and thus its behavior is b 2 = QBR(u 2 ; λ 2 ).
Note that the behaviors b 0 , b 1 , b 2 depend only on the parameters λ and not on the distribution of behaviors β j,t (Z), because in our game an agent plays against only one other agent. Now, let Π j (λ) = [b 0 b 1 b 2 ] be the |A| × 3 matrix with the QL 3 behaviors parametrized by λ. Thus, QL 3 implies that the expected aggregate action is,
which agrees with Lemma 1 for P j = Π j (λ).
More details on Bayesian computation
We now return to the dataset of Rapoport and Boebel (Rapoport and Boebel, 1992) presented in Table 2 , and give more details on the Bayesian computation on the model of Section 4 in the main paper. We use the same priors for both games. We assume diffuse priors for the parameters ψ, λ; in particular, we consider π(λ i ) ∝ Expo; i.e., an exponential random variable with rate around 1/10 for the parameters of the quantal best-response, a diffuse beta for ψ 1 and a flat variance prior for ψ 2 i.e., p(ψ 2 ) ∝ (1/ψ 2 2 ). As exact conditionals are hard to obtain under this model, we employ a Metropolis-Hastings scheme with a proposal distribution that simply disturbs slightly the current model parameters. This is efficient because we know beforehand that the values of our parameters are constrained; for example, we know that ψ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and that, roughly, λ i ∈ (0, Λ) for some Λ > 0, because the logistic functions of quantal best-response become flat above, or below, a certain threshold.
Our ultimate goal is to obtain imputations of the agent actions in t = 3 (period 4 in Table 2 ) through the posterior predictive distribution of our model. We run our chain for 1e5 iterations and assume the first half of the samples as burn-in period; traceplots of MCMC estimates of the model parameters are shown in Figure 4 . Additionally, a summary of the marginal posterior distribution of the model parameters is shown in Table 3 . There are a few interesting observations. First, note that although it was not explicitly specified, the model obtains λ 2 > λ 1 in general i.e., that level-2 agents have better precision than agents at level-1. Interestingly, in this dataset, level-2 agents play as-if level-1 agents are very precise (see values for λ (1)2 in Table 3 ). Furthermore, estimates on ψ 0 i.e., the coefficient for the lag-1 regression in our VAR model of agent behaviors is significant around 0.3, indicating a temporal trend in the latent behavioral state. We can verify this trend by inspection of the bottom-right plot in Figure 4 . Note that, overall, there is a steady decreasing trend for the proportion of level-0 agents and a parallel steady increasing trend for level-1 agents, across game time periods. This provides evidence of agent learning. b 1 ) for time periods t = 1(red, "+"), t = 2 (green, "x") and t = 3 (blue, "♦"). An overall decrease of level-0 agents and an increase in level-1 agents is observed across time periods. Other : MCMC estimates for selected model parameters. We observe good mixing for parameter ψ 1 (bottom-left), which is hard to achieve for parameters λ 1 , λ (1)2 (top 2 figures), since they are non-linear in the likelihood model. 
